By Willard C. Matthias
This survey of greater than fifty years of nationwide defense coverage juxtaposes declassified U.S. nationwide intelligence estimates with lately published Soviet records disclosing the perspectives of Soviet leaders and their Communist allies at the comparable occasions. Matthias exhibits that U.S. intelligence estimates have been frequently right yet that our political and armed forces leaders ordinarily overlooked them—with occasionally disastrous effects. The e-book starts off with a glance again on the position of U.S. intelligence in the course of international struggle II, from Pearl Harbor throughout the plot opposed to Hitler and the D-Day invasion to the "unconditional hand over" of Japan, and divulges how higher use of the intelligence to be had can have stored many lives and shortened the struggle. the subsequent chapters facing the chilly struggle divulge what info and suggestion U.S. intelligence analysts handed directly to policymakers, and likewise what occasionally sour coverage debates happened in the Communist camp, touching on Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile situation, the turmoil in japanese Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars within the heart East, and the Soviet intervention in Afganistan. in lots of methods, this can be a tale of neglected possibilities the U.S. govt needed to behavior a extra dependable overseas coverage which could have refrained from huge losses of existence and large costs on palms buildups. whereas now not exonerating the CIA for its personal error, Matthias casts new mild at the contributions that aim intelligence research did make throughout the chilly struggle and speculates on what may have occurred if that evaluation and suggestion were heeded.
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Extra resources for America's Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936-1991
During the same period, the Allies were breaking out of the Normandy peninsula and inflicting the first of a series of defeats on the German forces in France, Allied forces in Italy were marching on Rome, and the Russians launched a summer offensive which by mid-July had driven the Germans out of White Russia and into northeastern Poland. The Germans 36. Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 346–51. 37. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, 561. 30 A m e r i c a ’s S t r a t e g i c B l u n d e r s were in retreat nearly everywhere.
An intelligence failure did occur when the intelligence officers on the line failed to impress upon their superiors what was happening across the German border. A command failure occurred when the Allied generals, apparently hoping for a Christmas “pause,” did not take seriously the intelligence provided them when it was not touted as the latest news from the German High Command. The result was a campaign in the Ardennes that cost about 80,000 casualties, the vast majority of which were American.
According to Churchill’s account, there had been some discussion about excluding Italy from the reach of the declaration, but the subject was excluded from the official communiqué on the conference. Churchill was “surprised” when the President spoke of imposing unconditional terms upon all the Axis 39. See J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918–1945 (New York: Macmillan, 1956), 554–57. 40. Dulles, Germany’s Underground, 131–32. 32 A m e r i c a ’s S t r a t e g i c B l u n d e r s powers.